“WHEN THE ENEMY DREW OUR ATTENTION”¹:
RECONSIDERING PRIOR RESTRAINT IN THE CONTEXT OF
DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN

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INTRODUCTION

Through 2016 and 2017, a team led by Canadian virologist David Evans, and funded by an American pharmaceutical company, attempted to synthesize the previously extinct horsepox virus.² After just six months and an expenditure of $100,000, the research team was able to successfully construct the virus “using only commercially available information, technology and tools.”³ In January of 2018, the team went on to publish their information in an American-based journal, PLOS ONE.⁴

The publication was controversial because it included a potential “blueprint” for the synthesis of a genetic strand in the same viral family as the highly lethal, albeit eradicated, smallpox virus.⁵ Though horsepox does not itself cause infection in humans,
some have argued that the findings presented in *PLOS ONE* are dangerous nonetheless because “[t]he publication of the horsepox synthesis process lowers technical hurdles for making smallpox de novo.”6 Evans himself recognized the prospective risks inherent in such works, noting that although he notified the proper regulatory authorities, they “may not have fully appreciated the significance of, or potential need for, regulation or approval of any steps or services involved in the . . . synthesis[s] and replication [of] a virulent horse pathogen.”7

Research such as Evans’s, which does not pose an immediate threat but could be detrimentally misapplied for a possible bioterrorist attack, is not itself unique. This type of research is categorized as dual use research of concern (DURC).8 The Office of Science and Technology Policy, which advises the executive branch on the effects of science and technology on domestic and international affairs defines DURC as:

> life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.9

In the case of the horsepox virus, though the intent of the research—an attempt to craft a less toxic alternative to the smallpox vaccine10—was inherently noble, its publication posed a potentially insidious threat to national security because of its ability to serve as a blueprint for the synthesis of smallpox.11 The commercial availability of the research team’s materials, the relatively modest sum that was needed, and the short amount of time in which the synthesis was concluded, all contribute to the conclusion that replication and ill-intended expansion may not be difficult tasks to achieve.12

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6 *Id.* at 1.
7 *WHO Report, supra* note 3, ¶ 18.3.
10 *See* Noyce et al., *supra* note 2, at 6.
11 *See* Inglesby, *supra* note 5, at 1.
12 *Id.; see also* *WHO Report, supra* note 3, ¶¶ 18.1–18.3.
The publication of materials regarding DURC poses a difficult dilemma for research journals. The situation often forces publishers to choose between two, potentially antagonistic, options: help advance scientific progress through the proliferation of new information, or help ensure national security by limiting the chance of harmful information falling into the hands of nefarious actors. Transparency within the scientific community allows other researchers to build upon previous research rather than expending unnecessary resources in an attempt to reinvent the wheel. This is particularly useful in the quickly evolving field of genetic research. Contrarily, those whose arguments are more concerned with ensuring national security raise worries that the potential benefits do not outweigh the great risks within the current regulatory regime.

Weighing these conflicting arguments invokes several different considerations: bioethical, economic, and, most pertinent to this Note, constitutional. More specifically, the publishers must balance the compelling interest in ensuring national security with freedom of the press protections afforded by the First Amendment. The research and publication regarding the horsepox virus exemplifies this DURC dilemma. Prior to getting published in *PLOS*, David Evans’s team was turned down by two other research journals who refused to publish its findings due to the potential complications arising from dual use research of concern. Furthermore, the subsequent calls for increased regulatory oversight and censorship over such research help frame the underlying concerns and establish the timely need for guidance in this area. This need for guidance is particularly acute regarding the constitutional concerns which necessarily follow all requests for prior restraint over the publication of any subject matter.

Although numerous political commentators, scientists, and bioethicists have commented on the issue of DURC and the oversight policies that are currently

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15 See id.
exercised over it, there has been a notable lack of discussion regarding the First Amendment rights of the researchers. To the extent that there has been such discussion, the constitutional arguments have largely been used as a shield against any call for restraint placed on the publications.\textsuperscript{21} To be certain, arguments for a regime in which the government is more inclined to censor a work, or disqualify it for publication altogether, are hampered by the fact that courts have been remarkably hesitant to permit prior restraint over publications in general.\textsuperscript{22} This idea is exemplified by the relatively high success rate of journalists in Supreme Court litigation involving press regulation.\textsuperscript{23}

This is not to suggest, however, that the government is never permitted to subject a publication to increased oversight or censorship. The Supreme Court has articulated an exception in instances where national security is at stake.\textsuperscript{24} In \textit{Near v. Minnesota},\textsuperscript{25} a seminal case in the jurisprudence of prior restraint, the Supreme Court articulated that curtailing the First Amendment may be warranted in instances where the nation is at war and thus subject to a unique threat of danger.\textsuperscript{26} The Court stated that “[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”\textsuperscript{27} Since the \textit{Near} decision came down in 1931, this exception has been interpreted incredibly narrowly.\textsuperscript{28} Due to the Court’s current hesitancy in accepting prior restraint, any calls for censorship over publications involving DURC would face an uphill battle in articulating a strong enough justification for the restraint in terms of national security interests.

The purpose of this Note is to suggest that the courts should reevaluate the high burden associated with the national security exception articulated in the \textit{Near} decision.\textsuperscript{29} The Court’s reasoning in that case is nearly 100 years old. Threats to national security no longer come in the exclusive form of bullets and bombs. “In an age of terrorism, it is not just guns, explosives, and chemical or radiologic hazards that destabilize communities and countries; there is also the prospect of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens.”\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{21} See, e.g., Williams, supra note 16, at 372.
\textsuperscript{25} 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
\textsuperscript{26} Id. at 716.
\textsuperscript{27} Id.
\textsuperscript{28} See Ortner, supra note 24, at 17–18.
\textsuperscript{29} Near, 283 U.S. 697.
As gene-editing technologies continue to evolve and become more readily available to actors who may have interests adverse to those of the State, the potential for biowarfare on a national scale increases significantly.\(^{31}\) In instances such as the recent horsepox debate, where the published materials decrease the burden of synthesizing a deadly virus and thus increase the potential for bioweaponization, courts should be less tentative in considering some form of prior restraint.

Part I of this Note will explore key cases involving the application of the prior restraint doctrine. It will particularly focus on cases involving restrictions placed against publications alleged to have threatened national security in some capacity.\(^{32}\) Part II will explore in more detail the dangers associated with the publication of dual use research of concern, whether those dangers be in the form of a bioterrorist application or accidental exposure by unregulated entities.\(^{33}\) Part II will also apply the courts’ reasoning discussed in Part I to an argument in favor of exploring the potential applicability of prior restraint in the context of dual use research of concern.\(^{34}\)

I. KEY CASES ON PRIOR RESTRAINT

Though the *Near Court* was careful to categorize “prior restraint” as inherently suspect, it largely failed to establish a working and consistent definition of the term itself.\(^{35}\) Nor did the Court articulate, with any sort of precision, exceptions to the doctrine of prior restraint.\(^{36}\) This lack of clarity has led to a series of inconsistent applications of the doctrine, both within the judiciary and academia.\(^{37}\) Though this Note will delve deeper into the scope of the exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine, its purpose is not to glean a common, definitional trend from precedent. As a preliminary matter, it is enough to say that “prior restraint” can be defined as a suppression of speech before it is disseminated, a categorization which should be juxtaposed with subsequent punishment that occurs on a *post hoc* basis.\(^{38}\) Rather than analyzing the case law for the purpose of narrowing in on a more exact definition, a pointed inquiry into the applicable precedent will be utilized to see how the publication of


\(^{32}\) See infra Part I.

\(^{33}\) See infra Section II.A.

\(^{34}\) See infra Section II.B.


\(^{36}\) See id.

\(^{37}\) See id. at 1087–88.

dual research of concern may fit within the preexisting doctrine. By no means exhaustive, the analysis in this Section will primarily focus on four court opinions.

A. Near v. Minnesota

The First Amendment, which has been incorporated against the States, prescribes that the federal government “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” These few short words have produced many court decisions, which have sought to define the exact scope of the aforementioned rights, one of the most crucial of these being Near v. Minnesota. Though the case does not deal directly with issues of DURC, this seminal decision does serve as a useful starting point for determining the scope of First Amendment protections over the publication of particularly sensitive subject material.

In the Near case, a Minnesota statute allowed a court to enjoin an individual or business entity from engaging in the publication of any “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical.” The defendant in the case was a publisher of The Saturday Press, a Minneapolis-based newspaper which regularly published articles alleging that an organization of Jewish gangsters controlled the city’s illegal activities. The paper also accused local law enforcement officers of being paid off by the gang. The Minnesota Supreme Court first found that the statute was constitutionally valid, arguing that the Constitution does not afford protection over publications that were “devoted to scandal and defamation.” The court went on to articulate that the publications the defendant was engaged in were in violation of that statute.

In a 5–4 decision, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, in his majority opinion, reversed the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Justice Hughes focused on the distinction between prior restraint and the punishment that could follow allegations of libel. Quoting Blackstone, Hughes laid out the principle that:

[t]he liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon

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39 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
41 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
43 See EASTON, supra note 23, at 60–61.
44 Near, 283 U.S. at 702.
45 HENTOFF, supra note 42, at 188.
46 Id.
47 State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770, 770 (Minn. 1928).
48 Id. at 773.
49 Near, 283 U.S. at 722–23.
50 Id. at 713–15.
publications . . . . Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press . . . .

The Court found that prior restraint poses a peculiarly troublesome threat to First Amendment protections since the dissemination of information allows public discourse over the truthfulness or importance of particular statements. In other words, prior restraint does not permit these statements to ever enter into the public sphere. If the published statements are later found to be libelous or defamatory in some meaningful way, adequate remedies exist in a subsequent punishment context.

The Court did, however, indicate that the freedom of the press is not absolute. Chief Justice Hughes articulates four potential exceptions to the rule against prior restraint. Pertinent to this Note, Hughes articulates an exception for situations in which the nation is at war, opining that “[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.” Ultimately, the Court found that the Minnesota statute did not fall into any of these narrow exceptions, and, accordingly, the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court was reversed in favor of the defendant-publisher.

B. New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers Case)

Forty years after the Near decision, the Supreme Court once again revisited the issue of prior restraint on publication. In New York Times Co. v. United States, perhaps more readily known as the Pentagon Papers Case, the Court was forced to determine the constitutionality of injunctions placed on the publication of a classified Department of Defense (DoD) study in two major newspapers. The study, entitled “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy,” was leaked by one of its DoD authors to both the New York Times and the Washington Post.

51 Id. at 713–14 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52).
52 Id. at 719–20.
53 Id. at 720.
54 Id. at 716.
55 See Meyerson, supra note 35, at 1091–92. In a broad sense, the four exceptions that Chief Justice Hughes articulates are: (1) cases involving national security; (2) publications of obscenities; (3) incitements of violence; and (4) situations where it is necessary to protect private rights according to equitable principles. See id. at 1106.
56 Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
57 Id. at 722–23.
58 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
59 Id. at 714.
61 Id.
The newspapers, after considering the implications of the study, began printing excerpts from what began to be called the Pentagon Papers.62

The United States sought to enjoin future publication of the study, arguing that its dissemination posed a serious threat to national security, and that accordingly, the Executive branch was constitutionally permitted to take action to protect the safety of the country.63 The district courts refused to enjoin the publishers, finding that the government had not met its heavy burden in demonstrating the need for prior restraint.64

In a 6–3 per curiam opinion, with each of the nine justices adding their own concurring or dissenting opinions, the Court affirmed the decision of the district courts.65 Though the opinions differed in their interpretations of prior restraint and the case at bar, the per curiam opinion recognized that with prior restraint, there came “a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”66

In his concurring opinion, Justice White writes: “I do not say that in no circumstances would the First Amendment permit an injunction against publishing information about government plans or operations.”67 The Justice goes on to recognize that there may be instances, even in the case of the Pentagon Papers, where publication will likely lead to “substantial damage to public interests.”68 Nevertheless, Justice White found that the government had not met the high burden necessary to justify prior restraint being placed on the publication of this information.69 Though the concurring opinion fails to include a defined articulation of what the government would need to show in order to justify an injunction against publication, it does suggest that the Court may be more inclined to uphold instances of prior restraint if Congress were to designate certain types of publications that posed a particular threat to national security.70

Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, largely echoes the same idea that a free and robust press permitted to publish without impediment is key to an enlightened citizenry.71 The concurrence suggests that although the publication of certain sensitive information could be incredibly detrimental to national security, there are adequate remedies to the situation in the form of criminal laws that would permit subsequent punishment in the applicable circumstances.72 Justice Stewart concludes his opinion by suggesting, perhaps inadvertently, a standard in which to determine when the national security exception articulated in Near can come into play.73 He

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62 Id.
63 N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 717–18 (Black, J., concurring).
64 Id. at 714 (per curiam).
65 See id. (citations omitted).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 731 (White, J., concurring).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See id. at 732–33.
71 See id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
72 Id. at 730.
73 See id.
suggests that the government may have been successful if it were able to show that
the publication of the sensitive information would lead to “direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.”

C. United States v. Featherston

Following on the heels of the *New York Times Co.* decision, the Fifth Circuit,
in 1972, affirmed the convictions of two leaders of the Black Afro Militant Movement
(BAMM) who provided instructions to the group’s members on how to craft incendiary and explosive devices. The court found that the group had violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 231(a)(1), which criminalized the act of teaching another to create explosives or
firearms with the knowledge that that information would be used in the furtherance
of a civil disturbance.

The court, on the grounds that the dissemination of such information was a
“clear and present danger” to society, as that standard was articulated in *Dennis v.
United States*, upheld the convictions of the defendants. As one scholar explained, “[w]hile the basis for the court’s rejection of [defendants’] First Amend-
ment [argument] is not crystal clear, the court appears to distinguish between
protected ‘advocacy’ and specific instructions on how to commit crimes.” Thus,

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74 Id.
75 461 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
76 Id. at 1121, 1123.
77 This statute provides:

> Whoever teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application, or making of any firearm or explosive or incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, knowing or having reason to know or intending that the same will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder which may in any way or degree obstruct, delay, or adversely affect commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce or the conduct or performance of any federally protected function . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

78 Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1121.
79 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The *Dennis* Court was concerned with potential threats to the United States that were internal in nature, as opposed to external invasions or attacks. See *id.* at 509. In articulating what the phrase “clear and present danger” meant, the Court stated: “[T]he words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the *putsch* is about to be executed . . . .” *Id.* But see *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). *Brandenburg* established the “incitement to lawless action” standard, which moves away from the “clear and present danger” doctrine on which *Dennis* purported to rely.” *See id.* at 448–49; *id.* at 449–50 (Black, J., concurring).
81 Id.
the dangerousness of the defendants’ convictions was apparently evidenced by the movement’s professed plans for the “coming revolution” in addition to the idea that the instructions themselves contained potentially endangering information.  

D. United States v. Progressive, Inc.  

In 1979, the Department of Justice brought suit under the Atomic Energy Act against The Progressive, a Wisconsin-based magazine in order to enjoin them from publishing an article entitled, “The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We’re Telling It.” The article allegedly included information, some already within the public domain and some not, which explained how a hydrogen bomb is designed and how it functions. The government argued that “its national security interest . . . permits it to impress . . . censorship upon information originating in the public domain, if when drawn together, synthesized and collated, such information acquires the character of presenting immediate, direct and irreparable harm to the interests of the United States.”

While recognizing that any prior restraint on publication comes into court with a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, the court nevertheless found that the article in this case fell into the narrowly defined national security exception that was articulated in Near. In discussing the potentially harmful nature of the publication in question, the opinion states: “What is involved here is information dealing with the most destructive weapon in the history of mankind, information of sufficient destructive potential to nullify the right to free speech and to endanger the right to life itself.”

After balancing the need for free speech protections and national security concerns, the court found that the risk involved in the unbridled publication of such sensitive information was simply too important. The opinion stated that it was better to err on the side of caution, for the proliferation of such information “could pave the way for thermonuclear annihilation . . . .” If such destruction were to occur, “our right to life [would be] extinguished and the right to publish [would become] moot.” The court ultimately imposed a temporary restraining order on the defendant, marking

82 See Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1122–23.
83 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
85 Hentoff, supra note 42, at 213.
86 See id. at 213–14.
87 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 991.
88 Id. at 992–93, 996.
89 Id. at 995.
90 See id. at 996.
91 Id.
92 Id.
the first time in American history that a preliminary injunction was granted against press publication.93

Perhaps more elucidating than the order itself is the manner in which the court rationalized its decision against the defendant’s arguments. The Progressive raised several points in relation to the precedent which seemed to be clearly in their favor.94 Essentially, the defendant argued two main, interrelated points: (1) the publication in question was the product of information already in the public domain,95 and (2) the idea that the publication would lead to grave and irreparable harm, as articulated in New York Times Co., was too attenuated, especially when considering the fact that the nation was not currently at war.96

In response to the first argument raised, the court and the government conceded that some of the information presented in the proposed publication was indeed available in the public sphere.97 But the court went on to state that “[e]ven if some of the information is in the public domain, due recognition must be given to the human skills and expertise involved in writing this article. The author needed sufficient expertise to recognize relevant, as opposed to irrelevant, information and to assimilate the information obtained.”98 Stated differently, the court reasoned that the author was only able to produce the article due to his individual skill; after applying this expertise in the collection and compilation of his findings, the author then made the knowledge far more accessible to those without the otherwise requisite skill that was needed.99 The opinion states that even though the publication includes information available to the public, and even though the publication would most likely not serve as a “do-it-yourself” guide to hydrogen bomb crafting, the dissemination of this information could “provide a ticket to by-pass blind alleys.”100

With regards to the defendant’s second argument, the court disagreed with The Progressive, finding that there is indeed a threat of grave and irreparable harm associated with the publication of this information.101 Throughout the opinion, the court restates the proposition that annihilation in the form of a hydrogen bomb is one of the gravest threats posed against the country.102 The court distinguishes this case from New York Times Co. because the publication at issue there contained historical data that may simply cause some embarrassment to the United States, rather than an imminent threat to national security.103 In addressing the Near exception for national

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93 HENTOFF, supra note 42, at 214–15.
94 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 994.
95 Id. at 993.
96 Id. at 991–93.
97 Id. at 993.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 995–96.
102 See id.
103 Id. at 994.
security, the court opines that the nature of war and national security threats have changed since the 1930s.104 “Now war by foot soldiers has been replaced in large part by war by machines and bombs. No longer need there be any advance warning or any preparation time before a nuclear war could be commenced.”105

No higher court was able to review the decision as the case did not proceed past the Western District Court of Wisconsin.106 This is due to the fact that three days after the case was argued to the Seventh Circuit, another magazine published essentially the same potentially jeopardizing information that the government was trying to restrain The Progressive from publishing.107 The only difference between this new publication and the Progressive article was that the published piece included more information regarding the specific operation of the fusion weapons themselves.108

II. PROPOSAL FOR INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF PRIOR RESTRAINT
IN THE CONTEXT OF DURC

Although there has been a clear interest in addressing the issue of DURC and its publication, little consensus on what should actually be done has thus far emerged.109 One source of apparent agreement amongst those within and outside of the scientific community, however, is that restraints on DURC publication would most assuredly be struck down as unconstitutional.110 To be clear, however, this is currently little more than an assumption, as no court has ever addressed the constitutionality of different restrictions on DURC or DURC publication.111 But in an area of such grave concern—which poses a problem with no immediately apparent solution—why should some form of publication restriction be deemed inherently unlawful without ever looking to its potential merits?

From a policy perspective, outside the realm of constitutional debates, arguments raised in opposition to expanded DURC oversight and calls for increased safeguards

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104 Id. at 996.
105 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. (“[T]he government ‘conceded that the secret was indeed out’ and ‘announced that it was abandoning its case.’ In other words, the government’s case that [the Progressive author’s] article posed a danger to national security was mooted by the disclosure of information contained nowhere within his work.”).
109 See Williams, supra note 16, at 371 (“Numerous articles appeared in the popular media about . . . the controversy, and the scientific literature abounded with commentary and opinions . . . about the proper balance between the free flow of scientific information, national security and public health and safety. Although the debate has been robust, little consensus has emerged.”).
110 See, e.g., id.
in the publication process have expressed the need to ensure transparency in the community and to guarantee a robustly free system of publication.\textsuperscript{112} Even proponents of a new regulatory regime have been careful to avoid suggestions of outright prior restraint due to the presumption of unconstitutionality articulated by the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{113} But should this presumption completely invalidate an option that may be more effective in addressing the publication of DURC than the system currently in place?

This Note does not suggest that prior restraints on publication should be more willingly pursued by the government and upheld by the courts in all instances. It does not even necessarily suggest that such censorship would be the most effective way of addressing the national security concerns that arise from the publication of dual use research of concern. Rather, it simply suggests, by way of an examination of the DURC dilemma, that as threats to national security change, so should our constitutional response. The world is not the same as it was in 1931 when the Supreme Court decided \textit{Near v. Minnesota} and established a national security exception where prior restraints could be viewed more favorably by the courts.\textsuperscript{114} And as the world has changed, so have the national security threats which exist therein.

This Part of the Note will first briefly discuss the potential danger posed by the publication of dual use research of concern and its relation to national security concerns. Secondly, this Part will address how a potential restraint on DURC publication would fit within the general prior restraint framework discussed in Part I. After exploring some of the holdings of the cases discussed above, this Note seeks to demonstrate that although prior restraints have generally been frowned upon by the courts, there is some precedent to suggest that an imposition of such restraint on DURC publications may withstand constitutional scrutiny.

\textbf{A. DURC: A Modern Threat to National Security}

The threat involved in DURC publication is multifaceted: it involves a threat of bioterrorist application, accidental release by the researchers conducting the studies, or accidental exposure by those who may attempt to replicate the published DURC experiments in settings that may not be subject to strenuous oversight policies.\textsuperscript{115}

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\item 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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Though the CDC does not currently anticipate any immediate or direct bioterrorist threat, the potential for extensive harm remains. One grim assessment of the dangers associated with smallpox stated:

[I]f obtained and intentionally released, smallpox could cause a public health catastrophe because of its communicability. Even a single case could lead to 10 to 20 others. It is estimated that no more than 20% of the population has any immunity from prior vaccination. There is no acceptable treatment, and the communicability by aerosol requires negative-pressure isolation. Therefore, these limited isolation resources in medical facilities would be easily overwhelmed.

In 2012, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs explored the threat of dual use research of concern. It sought to balance the competing interests of the free exchange of scientific information and the necessity of ensuring national security. Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) made it clear that the threats of dual use research are real and increasingly prevalent in the modernizing world: “These are not hypothetical threats. Before he was killed, Anwar al-Awlaki [Yemeni-American al-Qaeda propagandist] reportedly sought poisons to attack the United States. Adding to these concerns, the new leader of al-Qaeda has a medical background. Therefore, he may have an even greater interest in pursuing chemical and biological terrorism.” Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) concluded the hearing by recognizing that while the government had a policy in place, there was a continued need to review U.S. policies addressing the problems associated with DURC publication.


For full reading of the reports, see Biological Security: The Risk of Dual-Use Research: Hearing Before the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012).

See id. at 4 (“[W]e want the benefits of scientific inquiry. . . . We also need to mitigate
Of particular concern today are the advancements being made in the field of genetic engineering and manipulation, namely with regards to developments in CRISPR-Cas9 technologies. CRISPR, an acronym for “Clustered, Regularly Interspaced, Short Palindromic Repeats,” is, in relatively simplistic terms, a gene editing process that implements “RNA guided nucleases to make site specific double strand breaks in the genome for the purpose of inactivating genes, modifying mutations, or inserting intact genes.” Essentially, CRISPR allows for the manipulation of genetic strands in a manner that is uniquely cost-effective and precise.

The relative availability and precision of this new gene-editing tool has sparked immense interest—and fear—from large segments of the population who, while recognizing its potential for novel advancements in medicine, are concerned with CRISPR’s dual use threat. Due to the rapid acceptance of this new technology and its broad availability, concerns regarding the potential hazards of CRISPR have not been adequately addressed by either lawmakers or the scientific community itself. This lack of adequate legislative oversight leaves numerous threats unaddressed, particularly that of bioterrorist application. “CRISPR’s ease of use . . . means that dangerous outcomes can result . . . . Pathogens could be engineered for biological attacks . . . against humans or against the food supply with devastating effects. . . . The problem is always one of uncertain risks at the beginning of the spread of new tools like this.”

Speaking in a sense broader than CRISPR-related threats, it is difficult to quantify the impact or likelihood of any potential bioterrorist attack (and more specifically, risk, and I think the policy that we have now is clearly aimed at doing exactly that. So we will follow it to see how it is going. Maybe we will come back again and do [another] hearing. . . .”).
the threat associated with the publication of DURC-related information). The risks inherent in the situation, however, could contribute to a compelling enough government interest in the form of ensuring national security.

B. DURC’s Place in Prior Restraint Precedent

Though precedent clearly establishes that any prior restraints placed on publication are immediately viewed by the courts as suspect, courts have allowed prior restraints on publications to preserve national security. This Section will explore how the issues involving DURC publication fit within a general framework of prior restraint jurisprudence. It will also further attempt to demonstrate that the DURC issue is distinguished from the situations involved in the precedential Supreme Court cases of *Near v. Minnesota* and *New York Times Co.*

By addressing the potential dangers involved in the publication of dual use research of concern, it will become evident that the DURC dilemma’s threat to national security may bring the issue into the realm of a *Near* exception. Ultimately the problems associated with the publication of this sensitive information make the situation more akin to cases like *United States v. Progressive* and *United States v. Featherston*.

1. Applying the DURC Issue to *Near v. Minnesota*

As one of the first cases that the Supreme Court heard regarding prior restraint, *Near v. Minnesota* established the enduring precedent that prior restraints on publication should be viewed as immediately suspect. In *Near*, Justice Hughes wrote that in order to avoid the problems associated with an overly burdensome and restrictive system of publication that plagued Great Britain, the Founding Fathers were careful to ensure broad protections for free speech. Hughes wrote: “In determining the extent of the

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129 When it is difficult to objectively assess the risks of different options and situations, the precautionary principle encourages one to consider the worst possible outcomes of different choices and make the choice that avoids them. See David B. Resnik, *H5N1 Avian Flu Research and the Ethics of Knowledge*, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 22, 28 (2013) (“Although we cannot quantify the risks [of publishing DURC-related findings], the threats are plausible and serious. The precautionary principle would instruct us to take reasonable measures to avoid, minimize, or mitigate those risks.”).

130 See discussion supra Part I.

131 283 U.S. 697 (1931).


133 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).

134 461 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972).


constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it
is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publica-
tion.”137 But the opinion does not stop there. The Court carefully articulated excep-
tions to the general rule, writing that “[n]o one would question but that a govern-
ment might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of
the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”138

Important to this Note, the exception regarding the sailing dates of transports
and the location of troops has historically been interpreted to be a somewhat broader
exception for ensuring national security in general.139 Though the Supreme Court
has never articulated the exact parameters of the national security exception, it has
the possibility, at least in a theoretical sense, of reaching situations in which the
publication of particularly sensitive information could lead to catastrophic effects
on national well-being.140 Thus, a prior restraint placed on dual use research of
concern may at least have the possibility of being shoehorned into the national
security exception articulated in Near.

It is also important to draw parallels specifically between the issue at hand in
Near (not just the exceptions articulated) and the issues surrounding DURC. The
state statute at issue in Near did not seek to address matters of national security.141
It was instead aimed at stamping out obscenities and potentially scandalous or
defamatory publications.142 Perhaps the Supreme Court took such a strong stance in
opposition to prior restraint simply because of the issue that was before them at that
very moment. Besides its belief that the United States has historically and unequivoc-
cally relied on the presumption that prior restraints on publication are an inherent
evil, the Court also justified its decision to strike down the state statute based on two
other principles.143 Firstly, the Court argued that if a party was adversely affected by
the scandalous and defamatory publications that the state attempted to stamp out,
said party would have a way to get redress post-publication, namely through state
libel laws.144 Secondly, the Court appears to suggest that in cases of defamatory and

137 Id. at 713.
138 Id. at 716.
139 Roger W. Pincus, Press Access to Military Operations: Grenada and the Need for a New
Analytical Framework, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 813, 818–19 (1987); Sonja West, When the President
140 See Pincus, supra note 139, at 819. Because the courts have generally not addressed
the national security exception in great detail, it is possible that it may only apply in times of
war. See id. This idea, however, is refuted, at least in some sense, by the exception’s appli-
cation in Progressive. See infra Section II.B.4.
141 See Michael Potere, Note, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: Citizens Recording Police
142 See id.; see also Near, 283 U.S. at 701–02.
143 See Near, 283 U.S. at 719–22.
144 See id. at 719–20 (“The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant pur-
veyors of scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from previous
obscene remarks, the most effective manner of addressing these problems may be within a marketplace of free ideas, for any impediment to such a system of free speech would be more detrimental than the defamatory or potentially inflammatory remarks themselves.\footnote{See id. at 721–22.}

Taken in turn, it is not immediately apparent that these two justifications would also correspond with restrictions placed on dual use publication, or any other matters involving potential threats to national security. With regards to the Court’s first justification, there may indeed be a system of subsequent punishments in place for the publication of potential threats to national security.\footnote{See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 262–77 (2008) (describing the current statutory regime that addresses the publication of information that poses a threat to national security, including: the Espionage Act, the Atomic Energy Act, and the Intelligence Identities Protection Act).} However, these subsequent punishments do not effectively cover what occurs with DURC publications. The jurisprudence in this field of law, specifically with respect to the Espionage Act,\footnote{See generally Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–99 (2012)).} has historically involved instances where a government agent has disclosed sensitive and confidential information to another person, rather than delivering it to the press for publication.\footnote{See generally Papandrea, supra note 146.}

A journal that publishes the findings of an experiment involving dual use research of concern would most assuredly never be prosecuted under any such statutes. For one, the information that would be published, although sensitive, would not be considered classified government materials. Furthermore, there is even some question as to whether different publishers could ever be prosecuted under the current statutory regimes.\footnote{See id. at 282.} It is possible that prosecution under these legislative acts can only be pursued against the government agents who disseminated the sensitive information in the first place, and not the publishers or, more importantly in the context of DURC, the non-governmental scientists conducting the research in the first place.\footnote{See id. at 283 (“Whatever the scope of the government’s power to restrict the First Amendment rights of its employees, the Court has been very explicit that a different First Amendment analysis applies to persons who have not voluntarily accepted a position of trust and a duty of confidentiality. Any prosecution against someone without a trust relationship with the government, therefore, must satisfy rigorous First Amendment standards.”).} Ultimately, unlike the state libel laws in \textit{Near v. Minnesota}, there is no system of subsequent punishment in place for the proliferation of dual use research that may lead to later catastrophic events.

The second principle that the Court in \textit{Near} seems to rely on to justify its condemnation of prior restraint is the idea that the most effective way of combating restraint in dealing with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with constitutional privilege.”).
certain ill-effects of publishing information is to have a system of robust public discussion. The concept behind this marketplace of ideas is that the public should be presented with all possible expressions to then consume the most credible source of information. The Supreme Court in *Near* opined that the effects of an impeded marketplace of ideas, especially a robustly open marketplace of ideas, would be far more detrimental than the effects of a scandalous publication. But in the case of DURC publications, the potential harms associated with it are far greater than the harms associated with the publication of scandalous or defamatory articles.


The Supreme Court, in *New York Times Co.* helped further elaborate on what the national security exception in *Near* did and did not cover. This case involved a situation in which *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* both engaged in a publication campaign in which they gradually released excerpts of the Pentagon Papers. The Pentagon Papers, which were leaked by Daniel Ellsberg, a former military analyst, contained a voluminous history of the United States’ involvement in Southeast Asia that was commissioned by Robert MacNamara in 1967.

Important to the case’s relevance to the DURC discussion, this particular history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the surrounding Southeast countries was just that, a history. The Pentagon Papers, at least as the Supreme Court viewed it, did not include any information that could potentially have an impact on future endangerments of national security. Rather, the Pentagon Papers merely demonstrated that individuals “at the highest levels of the [American] government . . . [had] deliberately deceived the American people” regarding the country’s position and decision-making strategy in the Vietnam War.

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153 *Near*, 283 U.S. at 722.
154 See supra Section II.A.
158 See HENTOFF, supra note 42, at 192.
159 See BOLLINGER, supra note 157, at 21–22.
160 HENTOFF, supra note 42, at 192. The Pentagon Papers showed that President Johnson was making efforts to commit more troops to Vietnam, while at the same time condemning his political opponent, Barry Goldwater, for “want[ing] to escalate the war.” *Id.* The Papers also showed instances where leaders of the State and Defense Departments made public announcements that victory in Vietnam was imminent, while privately knowing that the end was nowhere in sight. *Id.*
Nevertheless, the government, in an attempt to enjoin the newspapers from publishing further excerpts from the document, argued that prior restraint should be permitted in this instance because national security would indeed be jeopardized by further dissemination of the information. The government argued that by allowing the publication of such sensitive information, the Court would endanger the lives of American prisoners in Vietnam and would weaken the country’s ability to engage in foreign policy. But, the Court disagreed, finding that the government had not met its burden to show that such a historical account of United States’ involvement would have a substantial enough effect on national security to invoke the *Near* exception for allowing prior restraints on publication.

The issues involving the publication of dual use research of concern can be distinguished from the subject matter at question in *New York Times Co.* There, the information being published was historical, and the government was accordingly unable to demonstrate any semblance of evidence that the publication posed a significant threat to national security, at least not to the extent that the Court felt comfortable in chilling the press’s First Amendment protections. As demonstrated earlier in this Note, the publication of novel dual use research is not merely a summary of past events—instead, it is a potential blueprint for future, nefarious purposes. Dual use research of concern should thus be interpreted more in line with the *Near* Court’s articulation of threats to the traditional sanctity of the American military.

Although the Court in *New York Times Co.* reaffirmed the idea expressed in *Near v. Minnesota* that prior restraints are viewed with a presumption of invalidity, a

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162 HENTOFF, supra note 42, at 192–93. The government took the position that “other nations would no longer trust the ability of the [United States’] leaders to maintain the total confidentiality” required in diplomatic dealings. *Id.*
163 *N.Y. Times Co.*, 403 U.S. at 713–14 (per curiam); see also *id.* at 729–30 (Stewart, J., concurring).
164 *See infra* notes 164–67 and accompanying text.
165 *N.Y. Times Co.*, 403 U.S. at 722 n.3 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“I had gone over the material listed in the *in camera* brief of the United States. It is all history, not future events.”).
166 *Id.* at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Even if the present world situation were assumed to be tantamount to a time of war, or if the power of presently available armaments would justify even in peacetime the suppression of information that would set in motion a nuclear holocaust, in neither of these actions has the Government presented or even alleged that publication of items from or based upon the material at issue would cause the happening of an event of that nature.”).
168 *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (“No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”).
majority of the justices were careful to articulate that the unjustifiability of prior restraints is not absolute. For instance, Justice Stevens did not disclose the possibility of prior restraints being placed on the publication of information that could “inevitably, directly, and immediately” lead to a threat to national security. As this language appeared in just two of the concurring opinions, the Court did not articulate a proper scope of a national security exception and much less the scope of these three adjectives.

If these words were to be taken at face value, it would appear that any publication, no matter how sensitive and potentially detrimental to national security, would not lead to an inevitable and immediate imperilment to the security of the country. Even the publication of troop locations, specifically set aside as an exception in *Near*, would not necessarily lead to an inevitable, direct, and immediate cataclysm. Surely, there must be some sort of leeway in determining a publication’s threat to national security, for to take the Court’s phraseology literally would render the exception articulated in *Near* moot.

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170 See *id.* at 722 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“We need not decide therefore what leveling effect the war power of Congress might have [on the government’s ability to restrict the freedom of the press here, because this case arises from a war authorized by the president and not Congress].”); *id.* at 724–25 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]ur judgments in the present cases may not be taken to indicate the propriety, in the future, of issuing temporary stays and restraining orders to block the publication of material sought to be suppressed by the Government.”); *id.* at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I am convinced that the Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents involved[,] [b]ut I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.”); *id.* at 731 (White, J., concurring) (“I do not say that in no circumstances would the First Amendment permit an injunction against publishing information about government plans or operations.”); *id.* at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“And in some situations it may be that under whatever inherent powers the Government may have, as well as the implicit authority derived from the President’s mandate to conduct foreign affairs and to act as Commander in Chief, there is a basis for the invocation of the equity jurisdiction of this Court as an aid to prevent the publication of material damaging to ‘national security,’ however that term may be defined.”); *id.* at 749 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he First Amendment right itself is not an absolute . . . .”); *id.* at 757 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he judiciary may properly insist that the determination that disclosure of the subject matter would irreparably impair the national security . . . .”); *id.* at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“First Amendment absolutism has never commanded a majority of this Court.”).

171 See *id.* at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring).

172 See *id.; id.* at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (leaving open the possibility of allowing prior restraints for information that “will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation and its people”).

173 See infra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.


175 Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, *Prior Restraints on the Media and the Right to a Fair Trial: A Proposal for a New Standard*, 84 KY. L.J. 259, 273–74 (1996) (stating that although the *Near* Court’s articulation of a narrow exception was incredibly vague, it certainly left open some possibility for an exception to the prior restraint jurisprudence based on interests of national security).
Thus, a prior restraint on DURC publications may find its place in this apparent realm of unspecified application of threats deemed to cause “direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to [the] Nation.”176 Progressive will help shed further light on what instances the courts may be inclined to apply this language in allowing prior restraints on particularly harmful publications.177

3. Applying the DURC Issue to United States v. Featherston

From the outset, it is important to recognize that Featherston is not a civil case in which the court articulated its finding under a prior restraint analysis.178 Rather this court affirmed the convictions of the two defendants in question by looking purely at the legislation in question179 and whether the statute itself violated the defendants’ free speech rights.180 However, Featherston still provides a useful insight into how some courts have sought to guard against the proliferation of scientific or technical information that poses a potential threat to national security.181

Most pertinent to this Note is the manner in which the court articulated the “clear and present danger” test to the facts before it.182 The court found that the actions of the Black Afro Militant Movement (BAMM) were not constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.183 The Fifth Circuit made this determination for a number of reasons.184 Particularly important to the Circuit’s opinion was “that BAMM was a ‘cohesive and organized group . . . [consisting of] a force regularly trained in explosives and incendiary devices,’” that “oral testimony revealed that the members of BAMM were told to have the ingredients necessary to configure incendiary devices in their homes in order to prepare for the ‘coming revolution,’” and that “[m]embers were also told to be ready to use the devices ‘at a moments notice.’”185

With all of this being considered, however, there was simply no testimony to suggest that the revolution the defendants were preparing for had a concrete and

176 N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
177 See infra Section II.B.4.
178 See United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1120–23 (5th Cir. 1972) (affirming the criminal conviction of two defendants after finding the statutory grounds for the convictions were not unduly vague nor ran afoul of the free speech clause of the First Amendment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
180 Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1120–21.
181 See Bhagwat, supra note 80, at 31 (“Featherston . . . could easily have been placed within the category of scientific and technical facts—indeed, Featherston might even be considered a case involving military secrets.”).
182 Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1122–23.
183 See id. at 1121–23.
184 Id.
immediately forthcoming start date. The militant movement, though providing technical instructions for future acts of terrorism, did not “set a specific date,” it did not specify exact actions that the movement was planning to take, and it did not articulate any “specific target[ ].”

All of this is referenced to show that the “clear and present danger” that the Featherston court was concerned with, was not necessarily an imminent one. The Fifth Circuit suggested in this case that the First Amendment does not protect speech—or more specifically—instructions that pose a certain kind of threat, even if that threat is simply speculative at the time.

I again want to recognize that this is not a prior restraint case, but rather one in which the constitutionality of a criminal statute was considered by the court. Additionally, the type of speech at hand in Featherston was considered to be “crime-facilitating speech,” as there was truly only one purpose for it—to encourage civil disobedience and destruction. This should be juxtaposed with dual use research of concern, which, by its nature, cannot be considered to have solely a criminal purpose. For these reasons, the case is not directly on point with any potential calls for prior restraint to be placed on dual use research of concern publications.

However, I believe the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Featherston still helps support an argument in favor of prior restraints on the publication of dual use research of concern. If the courts are willing to entertain situations in which First Amendment protections are waived due to the potential threat that the speech poses, then the opportunity for prior restraints in a DURC context may stand up to judicial scrutiny. The fact that the court was still willing to support a statute that chilled the defendants’ free speech rights, despite there being no particularly imminent attack or even a specified target, helps support the idea that a similar rationale could be

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186 See id.
187 Id. at 628.
188 Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1122 (“The words ‘clear and present danger’ do not require that the government await the fruition of planned illegal conduct of such nature as is here involved.”).
189 See Larizza, supra note 185, at 628 n.189 (“Arguably, violent acts resulting from training BAMM members in the making of explosive devices could have been months or even years away based on the equivocal statement ‘we must get our heads and minds and bodies right for the revolution, no telling when the revolution might come.’”) (quoting Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1123 n.4).
190 Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1120–21.
192 Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC), U. CALIF. IRVINE OFF. OF RESEARCH, http://www.research.uci.edu/ref/durc/index.html [http://perma.cc/P945-CHWD] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (“[DURC] . . . is life sciences research that . . . can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat, with broad potential consequences, to public health and safety . . . or national security.”).
applied to the type of indeterminate threat posed by the dissemination of dual use research of concern.\footnote{One of the common criticisms of imposing restraints on the publication of dual use research of concern is the idea that it is nearly impossible to measure the probability of an attack, or the causation between the publication of DURC and mal-intentioned applications of that information. See, e.g., Michael J. Imperiale & Arturo Casadevall, A New Synthesis for Dual Use Research of Concern, 12 PLOS MED. 1, 3–4 (2015), http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001813&type=printable [http://perma.cc/HK3B-5THX] (“Attempts have been made to estimate the probability of an accident, and while there is disagreement about the actual numbers, the chances are clearly greater than zero. We are faced with risks of bioterror and biosafety breaches that we can only guess at or estimate.”).}

4. Applying the DURC Issue to \textit{United States v. Progressive}

\textit{Progressive}, though useful in analyzing how at least one court has handled the publication of dual use research of concern, has not necessarily been well-received\footnote{See, e.g., John Cary Sims, Triangulating the Boundaries of Pentagon Papers, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 341, 423–24 (1993) (“[I]t seems very likely that Pentagon Papers . . . calls for rejection of injunction claims like those advanced by the Government in the \textit{Progressive} case.”); Williams, supra note 16, at 364 (“The ensuing court case [\textit{Progressive}], and what happened while the case was pending, illustrates the law’s inadequacy to deal with threats posed by publication of DURC that is in private hands.”).} and its reasoning was never reviewed by a higher court.\footnote{Williams, supra note 16, at 364.} In fact, the government dismissed the case just three days after oral argument in front of the Seventh Circuit.\footnote{Masur, supra note 106, at 1349.} For these reasons, I do not suggest that the opinion should be viewed as any form of binding precedent, or even a necessarily persuasive case for future courts to rely on. That said, I find it important to explore the reasoning of the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin for the primary reason that it is one of the few, if not the only, courts that have explored the issue of prior restraints being placed on DURC publications (though the court never explicitly considered the issue as such).\footnote{Though not recognizing the issue as one of dual use research of concern, the court struggled with the conflicting goals of facilitating the open exchange of useful, technical information and ensuring safety. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (“A mistake in ruling against \textit{The Progressive} will seriously infringe cherished First Amendment rights. . . . It will infringe upon our right to know and to be informed as well. A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear annihilation for us all.”).}

It is important to draw parallels between the actual information that was to be published in \textit{Progressive} with the type of information that is associated with dual use research of concern. In \textit{Progressive}, the court was concerned with the publication of technical information that could be used for nefarious purposes, writing
specifically that “this Court concludes that publication of the technical information on the hydrogen bomb contained in the article is analogous to publication of troop movements or locations in time of war and falls within the extremely narrow exception to the rule against prior restraint.” Arguably, this information could have also been used in the name of expanding scientific understanding, just as dual use research of concern seeks to do with publications regarding life sciences research.

The court’s opinion, while recognizing the heavy presumption against prior restraint in American jurisprudence, ultimately feared the dangers of thermonuclear annihilation more than it feared the necessary chilling effect on free speech protections for the publisher. In other words, “the district court placed ‘the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ above the freedom of the press in its ‘hierarchy of values.’” Prior restraint on dual use research of concern, as has previously been argued in this Note, finds its justification on these grounds for national security.

The threat of ill-intentioned bioterrorist application of DURC, as the threat of “thermonuclear annihilation” in *Progressive*, is incredibly grave, and its impact on society’s well-being cannot be understated. While a fear of global, thermonuclear proliferation is not merely a relict of the Cold War, the fears have at least changed to encompass the threat of bioterrorism as well. This modern threat, with its cataclysmic potential, should be considered in the same manner as the threat of nuclear annihilation was considered by the *Progressive*.

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198 *Id.*

199 *See id.* at 995–96 (“Erwin Knoll, the editor of *The Progressive*, state[d] he [was] ‘totally convinced that publication of the article will be of substantial benefit . . . because it will demonstrat[e] that this country’s security does not lie in an oppressive . . . system of secrecy . . . but in open, honest, and informed public debate . . . .’”).

200 *Id.* at 995–97.


202 *Progressive, Inc.*, 467 F. Supp. at 995 (“What is involved here is information dealing with the most destructive weapon in the history of mankind, information of sufficient destructive potential to nullify the right to free speech and to endanger the right to life itself.”).

203 *See supra* Section II.A.


205 Dean A. Wilkening, *BCW Attack Scenarios*, in *THE NEW TERROR: FACING THE THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS* 76, 96 (Sidney D. Drell et al. eds., 1999) (“States may have a greater incentive to acquire BCW [biological and chemical weapons] today for their security because the international system is less stable now than in the bipolar Cold War era.”).
CONCLUSION

Freedom of speech, and particularly freedom from censorship, is necessary for the functioning of an ordered democracy. It ensures that the represented people will have an avenue to voice their concerns and criticisms of the government without having to resort to revolution. It allows a multitude of ideas and expressions to be considered in the marketplace of ideas. And, pertinent to this Note, it helps facilitate the advancement of knowledge, which one would hope to be used exclusively for beneficial purposes. The First Amendment’s unique importance in American governance is exemplified by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Near: “In determining the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication.”206

However, not all speech is for benevolent purposes, and even when such expression is well-intentioned, it can still lead to unforeseen, harmful circumstances. It is for this reason that not all speech is protected, and it is arguably the reason that the Supreme Court has articulated certain instances where prior restraints on publication are permitted. It is in the context of these articulated exceptions, namely the exception for national security, that an argument can be made for constitutionally permissible prior restraints being placed on the publication of dual use research of concern.

While recognizing the immense importance of free speech protections, the threat that unregulated DURC publication poses is immense. Although it is far from clear that outright restraints are the best way to address the threat, or even a particularly practical way to address it, its sensibleness should be explored, free from the idea that all prior restraints are immediately violative of the First Amendment.